A military and civilian aviation veteran explains Wednesday night's crash

Several pilots wrote in - I thank you all. I found this explanation both admirably complete and largely apolitical, and I think you will too.

The author’s name is J.R. Rudy. He raises several issues I haven’t heard before, including the crosswinds that were swirling Wednesday night and the lack of a safety observer on the Black Hawk’s training mission. Beyond that - I’d rather let him speak for himself, unedited.

I am responding to your recent note about input from pilots regarding the DCA crash.

I could go on for hours about this but will condense it the best I can without too much unsupported speculation.

I am a retired aviation professional with nearly 40 years of flying experience. The first 8 years I served as a Fighter Pilot flying the F-14 in the US Navy from aircraft carriers. Collateral duties included service as a Landing Signals Officer (the tower for the carrier) a Standardization Officer. I was one of the primary investigators into the mid-air collision of a TopGun F-16 and one of my squadron's F-14s. No jets or lives were lost.

After leaving the Navy, I flew domestically and internationally for Delta Air Lines for over 30 years, the last 20 out of JFK.

I have flown into DCA [Reagan National] countless times as a pilot, though not recently. I did land there about a week ago at 1130p, as a passenger, landing to the south flying the River Visual 19 approach. Challenging but fun, hand flown approach with a great view of DC from the port window seat.

I have ridden in but never piloted a helo, nor have I flown in one anywhere in the DCA helo corridor. Like other pilots and boaters on the Potomac, I have often seen helocopters there.

It is readily evident that the Army Blackhawk was flying visually, headed south on Helo Route 1, then transitioning to Route 4 abeam DCA. On the chart, there is a max altitude restriction of 200' from the Key Bridge to the Wilson Bridge on these two routes, inclusive of the area of the crash.

UH-60A and subsequent Black Hawks have VHF radios, just like commercial jets so separate UHF communication should not have been an issue.

Below there is a link to the Helo chart for the DC area below, showing the VFR helo corridor paths and altitude restrictions.

The accident appears to be a classic CRM "swiss cheese" multiple failure event, as are most aircraft accidents.

Any one of the following interventions could have prevented this accident:

-More timely, accurate and positive confirmation of traffic by an overtasked ATC [air-traffic control] controller.

-Adequate staffing in ATC tower.

-Black Hawk copilot/evaluator/instructor taking command of the aircraft or issuing timely instructions to correct altitude deviation.

-Observation/safety observer pilot aboard who is not wearing NVGs.

-Not doing military training missions in busy airport approach corridor when a much safer less congested one is available to the south of DCA

-Use of collusion avoidance technology by the Black Hawk. Airliners have this and can visualize on screen potential threats, although this is low altitude inhibited.

-and most importantly, adherence to published altitudes.

-If the American commuter pilots had not accepted the side-step on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach from RW1 to RW 33 there would be no collision.

-If a single pilot was not wearing NVGs, the plane might have been visible.

-If the helo was on altitude, they may have been able to discern the aircraft lights unobscured in the night sky looking up rather than looking level into lights on the west shoreline.

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(Decent writing for less than 20 cents a day. Great notes from readers for free.)

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From the limited info available I am able to draw a few conclusions.

1. The helo was flying higher than the max permitted 200'. Had they adhered to this altitude restriction the accident would not have happened.

2. The ATC controller apparently did not provide timely, accurate, complete advise to the helo of the commercial airline traffic on approach to DCA.

3. The ATC controller apparently was task-saturated, performing dual roles, perhaps at the end of a long shift when attentiveness wanes.

4. The American jet may have been belly up to the helo in the final part of his turn or in subsequent corrections to centerline due to #5.

5. Strong, gusty crosswinds winds of 25 knots may have necessitated to a steep turn of the American jet to prevent overshoot of centerline and also affected helo altitude control.

6. NVG use by both pilots may have rendered the American jet invisible due to oversaturation of background lighting emanating from the west side of the Potomac.

7. The helo exhibited an erratic flight path, executing two near 90 degree turns, turning west off course, crossing Haines Point and heading directly to the north end of DCA airport before turning back south along the river. Given the airspace, this is indicative of inexperience, unfamiliarity and possibly even incompetence.

8. The inability of the pilot to maintain altitude, especially on a clear night is highly indicative of aircraft unfamiliarity, lack of recent flying, and gross incompetence, likely exacerbated by the unpracticed use of NVGs.

9. Military pilots love to do low level flying, especially in cool places like up the Potomac River by DCA and the Capital at night and take risks.

10. The Warrant Officer instructor pilot may have had a possible hesitancy to correct a (new?) female Captain of unknown qualifications and experience and higher rank.

11. There appears to be zero accountability of the American commuter pilots in the accident. They were exactly where they should have been on the MV 01 approach and sidestep to the RW 33 visual approach.

The DCA Potomac corridor is not one to be used in training new and inexperienced pilots, who are not current and highly experienced with NVGs.

It is my sincere hope that the female pilot flying the helo earned her place in this unit, based on merit, and there are no DEI factors involved. This unit is a highly competitive, desired assignment that has traditionally been awarded to the best of the best for a non-combat tour.

I know this because my Army helo pilot brother-in-law was going to be assigned to this unit as a bonus tour following the completion of his helo instructor tour in Iran in 1979. This deployment ended poorly, given the revolution. He was killed in a military C-12 plane crash when escaping Iran. I believe his transport was shot down. If so, it was covered up by the Carter Administration to avoid fanning the flames of war, but that is another issue.

Disclaimer: I have used night vision scopes and a monocular, but have never worn military or civilian NVGs either when flying or on the ground.